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•   A bst ra k t   • 
Europartie są rozpatrywane jako organizacje 
wielopoziomowe, podobne do partii działają-
cych w państwach federalnych lub przecho-
dzących procesy dewolucji. W artykule rozwa-
żano, czy mogą one w ogóle być analizowane 
jako partie polityczne sensu stricto i czy kon-
cepcje stosowane do badania relacji pomiędzy 
regionalnymi i krajowymi strukturami par-
tyjnymi (integracja wertykalna, wpływ) mogą 
być używane do studiowania relacji pomiędzy 
strukturami krajowymi i europejskimi. Zwró-
cono uwagę, że europartie mogą być rozpatry-
wane zarówno jako dodatkowe płaszczyzny ak-
tywności partii krajowych, jak i niezależni ak-
torzy polityczni, w skład których wchodzą par-
tie krajowe (partie wielopoziomowe). Ta druga 
•   A bst rac t   • 
Europarties are regarded as multi-level orga-
nizations, like parties operating in federal or 
devolved states. Examined is whether they can 
even be treated as political parties sensu stricto 
and whether the concepts used to test the rela-
tions between the national and regional party 
structures (vertical integration, influence) 
could be used to study relationships between 
the national and European structures. It was 
indicated that Europarties can be considered 
both as the additional arenas of national par-
ties’ activity and independent political actors 
consisted of national parties (multi-level par-
ties). The second perspective was used to re-
search 13 existing Europarties. In result, the 
similarities between the PES and PEL, but dif-
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Introduction
The processes of federalisation, devolution and regionalization, though equally 
the development of European integration have caused political parties to receive 
new areas of activity. The creation and strengthening of the position of regional 
assemblies and the European Parliament have meant that political parties have 
gained new arenas for electoral competition, the representation of interests and 
articulation of views. In this context Swenden and Maddens talk about “territorial 
dimension” of party politics (2009).
The transfer of powers from the state to the subnational and supranational 
levels has led to changes in power allocation within political parties. This does 
not concern the new division of power between the leaders, activists and ordinary 
members, about which a lot of studies have been devoted (Katz, Mair, 1995; Po-
guntke, Webb, 2005; Dalton, Wattenberg, 2002; Luther, Muller-Rommel, 2005), 
but rather the distribution between the different levels of structure – Europe-
an, national, regional. This has resulted in a kind of multi-level party, which is 
“a party of multiple territorial levels, representing competing sources of formal 
power as well as discursively structured antagonisms between the party’s centre 
and its constituent parts” (Moon, Bratberg, 2010).
Despite the growing interest in multi-level parties and almost a general recog-
nition that this is the result of the simultaneous processes of state decentralization 
and European integration, analyses are concentrated mainly on relations between 
the national and regional (subnational) structures of state-wide political parties. In 
this context, it is worth paying attention to studies on British, Spanish, German 
and Belgian political parties. Besides the above mentioned, the following authors 
perspektywa została wykorzystana do badania 
13 istniejących europartii. W rezultacie uda-
ło się wykazać podobieństwa pomiędzy PES 
oraz PEL oraz różnice pomiędzy EPP o PES 
pod względem poziomu integracji wertykalnej 
i wpływu. Dzięki temu w artykule udowodnio-
no, że nie ma jednego modelu relacji pomiędzy 
krajowymi i europejskimi strukturami partii 
oraz, że europartie różnią się między sobą pod 
względem ich wewnętrznej struktury organiza-
cyjnej czy ich relacji z partiami krajowymi. 
S łowa k luc z owe : europartie, podejście wie-
lopoziomowe, wielopoziomowe struktury orga-
nizacyjne, integracja wertykalna
ferences between the EPP and PES in term of 
vertical integration and influence were shown. 
Hence, in the article was proven that there is 
no one model of relations between the national 
and European party structures and the parties 
differ from each other as far as their internal 
structures are concerned.
Ke y word s : Europarties, multi-level appro-
ach, multi-level organization, vertical integra-
tion
Beat a  Kosowsk a-Gą s to ł   •   Are the Europarties Real Political Parties? 11
need noting: Thorlakson (2009, 2013), Fabre (2008, 2011), Hough and Jaffrey 
(2006), van Biezen and Hopkin (2006), van Houten (2009), Detterbeck (2012). 
Less attention has been paid to the relations between the European and national 
as well as the European and regional party structures. The latter having been 
mainly presented in a study by Hepburn (2010). The relations between European 
and national party structures were noticed mostly by Deschouwer (2000, 2003, 
2006).
There is also the growing literature related to Europarties beginning from Mar-
quand (1978), Pridham and Pridham (1981) and Niedermayer (1983) through 
Gaffney (1996), Hix and Lord (1997) to Delwit, Külahci and van de Walle (2001), 
Johansson and Zervakis (2002), Mittag (2006), Fiala, Mareš and Sokol (2007), 
Hanley (2008), Armbrecht (2008), de Prat (2009), Mittag and Steuwer (2010) and 
special issue of Acta Politica (Timuş, Lightfoot, 2014) to name only a few. But 
there is a lack of research on the Europarties investigated as multi-level organisa-
tions. The aim of the article is to fill this gap, therefore the relations between the 
national and European levels of party structures are here of special importance. 
The subject of the analysis are “political parties at the European level”, considered 
as organizations that were lawfully acknowledged according to the EC regulation 
on Europarties (Regulation – EC – No 2004/2003) and which obtained grants 
from the EU budget in 20131.
The article was divided into three parts. Because of the existing controversy 
whether Europarties can be regarded as political parties, the first section address 
this issue. There is an evaluation of the possibility of applying traditional approach-
es into political parties (structural, functional) to an analysis of Europarties. The 
aim is to prove the hypothesis that they can be regarded as parties sensu stricto. 
In the second part attention is drawn to the possibility of researching Europar-
ties as multi-level organizations, wherein the fundamental problem that has to be 
addressed is whether Europarties should be researched as additional arenas of the 
activities for domestic parties or as independent political actors – organisations in 
their own right comprised of national political parties which are their members. 
The framework to analyse the Europarties is outlined here. Final part concen-
1 This selection covers 13 organisations: the European People’s Party (EPP), the Party of Eu-
ropean Socialists (PES), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the European 
Green Party (EGP), the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR), the Party 
of European Left (PEL), the Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (MELD), the 
European Democratic Party (EDP), the European Free Alliance (EFA), the European Alliance for 
Freedom (AEF), the Alliance of European National Movements (AEMN), the European Christian 
Political Movement (ECPM) and the EU Democrats (EUD).
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trates on the empirical researches (based on the Europarties statutory documents) 
and aims to assess the relations between the European and national structures of 
13 analysed Europarties. Its purpose is to verify the hypothesis that the degrees 
of vertical integration of Europarties as well as the influence that national parties 
exert upon European party structures are varied in individual Europarties.
Are the Europarties Real Political Parties?
Although the European integration process was intended to have the technocratic 
nature, political parties have been present in it from the outset, both directly and 
through national governments. The importance of parties gradually but steadily 
increases along with the development of integration processes. Nowadays in the 
context of the EU we can distinguish three kinds of party organizations. Firstly, 
there are national political parties, which participate in the integration process 
mainly indirectly by members of national governments (in the EU Council), who 
are party politicians. Secondly – the political groups in the EP, thirdly – extra-
parliamentary “political parties at European level” (Europarties, European politi-
cal parties). The latter have their source in transnational party federations, which 
were established in the 1970s before the first direct elections to the European 
Parliament. After the entry of the Treaty of Maastricht into force, most of party 
federations evolved into “political parties at the European level”. The next step, 
that caused consolidating the already existed Europarties and establishing new 
ones, was the adoption of the regulation defining the status of “political parties at 
European level” and granting them funding from the EU budget. In accordance 
with the provisions of the regulation, Europarties can be created as “associations 
of citizens” or “alliances of political parties”. In practice they pursue the second 
pattern and are created by domestic political parties, which are their members. 
A European political party should meet the following criteria: to have a legal 
personality in the EU member state in which its seat is located, to represent at 
least one quarter of member states (nowadays 7 of 28), to observe the principles 
on which the European Union is founded and to participate in the EP election or 
express the intention to do so (Regulation – EC – 2004/2003).
On the basis of the mentioned regulation 16 organizations got a status of Eu-
roparties, but 3 of them lost it, because they stopped to meet the criteria. This does 
not change the fact that it is still under discussion whether Europarties can even 
be considered real political parties. Whereas some researchers are inclined to do so 
(Hix, Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002; Sobolewska-Myślik, 2005), other scholars refuse 
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the existing organizations this title (von Arnim, Schuring, 2004; Vieira, 2011; 
Jacuński, 2006). Europarties are sometimes treated like political parties sui generis 
or in statu nascendi (Oppelland, 2006). The issue is complicated, because there 
are a lot of definitions of political parties that determine the conditions, which 
organization should meet in order to be considered as a political party. Everything 
therefore is a matter of a definition we use.
According to the definition of Sartori: “A party is any political group that 
presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for 
public office” (2005). Europarties do not directly place candidates in elections 
in order to take power; hence from this point of view they do not complete con-
ditions of the definition and cannot be considered as political parties. But we 
should agree with Bonotti that: “this kind of definition risk providing too narrow 
a picture of the more complex and subtle role parties play” (2011). Political parties 
fulfil a lot of functions in political systems thanks to their intermediary position 
between a state and a civil society. The third parties in the USA for example do 
not have any real chance to win elections. Their raison d’ être is to act as agencies 
of democracy that help citizens influence the process of governing (Lawson, 1980). 
Hence on the basis of such a definition Europarties can be considered as parties, 
because they seek to affect the agenda and decision-making processes in the EU.
The verification of the hypothesis that Europarties are political parties sensu 
stricto, can be conducted on the basis of two main approaches in the defining 
of parties – the functional and the structural. In the light of the functional ap-
proach this hypothesis is difficult to maintain. Europarties accomplish only to 
a limited degree the main functions of political parties – the social function and 
that of governance. The first is accomplished chiefly by national political parties, 
which do not fulfil that successfully the tasks entrusted them, failing to inform 
the electorate of their connections with European party structures, conducting 
campaigns before EP elections based on national and not European questions, etc. 
The function of governance is accomplished chiefly through the impact made on 
the decision making process at its various stages. However, it follows to remember 
that Europarties are neither the only nor the main actors striving to influence the 
EU agenda and the decision-making process. Within the framework of function 
of governing Europarties equally strive to fill posts, something however that to 
a large degree remains the domain of the member states, therefore the Europarties 
have merely an indirect influence upon these decisions. The exception being the 
posts within the European Parliament, the assignment of which is based upon 
inter-party agreements. On the basis of the new regulations adopted in the Lisbon 
Treaty – Europarties have also the opportunity to exert a greater influence on the 
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selection of the head of the European Commission. More decidedly optimistic 
appears the accomplishment of the organisational function. Europarties not only 
adjust their structures to the changing environment, but also themselves try to 
shape their conditions by influencing the EU legislation.
The hypothesis discussed as to the possibility of considering Europarties to be 
real political parties is easier when considered against structural definitions. Ac-
cording to these, parties are organisations of a definite internal structure, while 
each of the elements within this structure has a specific role to fulfil. The develop-
ment of Europarties, especially those whose roots reach back to the transnational 
federations of parties functioning since the 1970s, led to the elaboration of ex-
pansive structures capable of undertaking decisions in all the areas of traditional 
party activity (party on the ground, party in public office, party in central office, 
Katz, Mair, 1994), even if in certain of these their role is a modest one (Hix, 1996; 
Bardi, 2005; Johansson, 2004; Sobolewska-Myślik, 2005).
To sum up, the adoption of structural definitions as a starting point allows one 
to corroborate the hypothesis that Europarties can be considered as real political 
parties. The functional approach leads to more pessimistic conclusion. Europarties 
do not fulfil some functions pointed out in a classic catalogues for example do not 
peruse control of the government apparatus. However, Schonfeld in his critique of 
the functional approach, enhances that domestic parties also do not fulfil all func-
tions attributed to them, but despite this they matter, because: “They do many 
things, even if in each arena of feasible activity their contribution in not necessar-
ily the most critical one, the number of arenas in which they perform make them 
central to an understanding of politics in the contemporary nation-state” (1983). 
The same can be said about Europarties operating in the EU political system.
Multi-level Approach in Researches on Europarties
Europarties operate in a multi-layered environment; hence it is worth to consider 
using the multi-level approach to analyse their structures. This approach is very 
popular in researches on political parties in federal states and in the latest decades 
its importance is growing because of using it to investigate the parties in region-
alized and devolved states. These studies are devoted to the analysis of relations 
between the national and subnational (regional) party structures. Scholars devel-
oped even a special framework for analysis (Thorlakson, 2009, 2013; Fabre, 2011; 
Detterbeck, 2012). In order to research Europarties it is important to answer the 
question as to whether it is adequate to use this framework to investigate the rela-
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tion between the national and European party structures. Therefore, in the first 
place shown is how the relationship of the regional and national party structures 
are studied, and then the discussion is conducted about the possibility of similar 
research on the relationship of the national and European party structures.
The multilevelness of party structure appears to be especially important in three 
areas which are crucial for the functioning of political parties: political recruit-
ment (especially candidate selection), electoral strategies and governing strategies. 
According to van Biezen and Hopkin, each of these areas is the zone of potential 
conflicts between the central and regional levels of the party structure (2006). It 
seems that these areas are useful only to a limited extent to explain the relationship 
between the European and national levels. The national party structure has a mo-
nopoly in candidate selection and the adoption of electoral strategies for elections 
to national parliaments; it is also responsible for candidate selection and campaign 
strategies in elections to the European Parliament. However, the European politi-
cal parties are beginning to engage in electoral activity. The report on candidate se-
lection to the EP in the member states, prepared under the direction of Lehmann, 
shows that nearly 20% of national parties reported some interaction with the Eu-
ropean level structure during the candidate selection phase (Lehmann, 2009; Bardi 
et al., 2010). It should be noted in particular the pressure to ensure the re-selection 
of incumbent MEPs. A new area of  electoral activity could also be opened for Eu-
roparties in connection with the plans to create a pan-European constituency and 
Europe-wide electoral lists of candidates, but this is a matter for the future.
An increasing involvement of European structures in campaigns before the 
EP election is also observed. European political parties adopt electoral manifestos 
and try to convince national political parties to use them during the campaigns. 
Although the national parties usually do not feel bound by these manifestos and 
adopt their own, the national manifestos partly repeat the positions and values 
expressed in the supranational manifestos. Before the EP election in 2009 some 
parties did not adopt their own electoral programmes at all, but used translated 
version of the respective European political party manifestos. This was, for exam-
ple, the case with the French Socialists, the Slovak Green Party and the Alliance 
of Democratic Left form Poland. Gagatek indicates that, apart from manifestos, 
the European political parties develop a number of additional electoral activities, 
which he labels as “service providing”. Europarties prepare achievements’ lists of 
their political group in the EP, produce special gifts, leaflets, stickers and others 
promotional materials. They also organize special meetings, which are attended by 
the EP candidates and by the national party leaders as well. They not only provide 
an opportunity to present or promote an electoral manifesto, but also create an 
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occasion for candidates to have photos taken with well-known politicians, which 
can be used later in the campaign (2009). Moreover, the regulation of 18 Decem-
ber 2007 which amended the previous regulation governing political parties at the 
European level allowed for the financing of the campaign to the EP from funds 
coming from the EU budget (Regulation – EC – No 1524/2007), thus it gave new 
impetus for Europarties to engage in election campaigns. It is therefore assumed 
that Europarties’ involvement in election campaigns will gradually increase.
The most difficult issue is to examine the relationship between the European 
and national party structure in the area of governmental strategies. First of all, 
Europarties do not seem to be able to influence the process of government forma-
tion at the state level. Secondly, there is no government in the traditional meaning 
at the European level, thus the influence of national parties on the EU govern-
ance seems to be more complicated. However, a more detailed examination of 
this point reveals interactions also in this area. For example, Europarties protest 
against their member parties entering into coalitions with the extreme right and 
nationalist parties at the national level and try to exert pressure to prevent them 
from doing this. This happened both in the EPP (reacting to the Italian Forza 
Italia coalition with the National Alliance and the Austrian People’s Party coa-
lition with the Freedom Party of Austria) as well as within the PES. The latter 
suspended the membership of the Slovak SMER after this party formed a coali-
tion with communists and nationalists at the national level. The national political 
parties try to also exert influence on EU governance, for example by affecting the 
composition of the Council and the formally apolitical European Commission as 
well as the European Parliament through selecting their candidates that are then 
elected in direct ballots.
Another issue to discuss is whether the concepts used to determine the rela-
tionship between the national and regional organizations can also be applied to 
study the relationship between the supranational and national structures. Rela-
tions between the national and regional party structures are usually characterized 
by: vertical integration, influence and autonomy. There is a general consensus in 
the subject literature on the meaning of the concept of vertical integration in 
political parties, but some difficulties arise when we try to operationalize the con-
cept. Vertical integration refers to the extent and strength of linkages between 
a regional and central party structure (Thorlakson, 2009). The existence of the 
linkages means that the party is vertically integrated and the levels are interde-
pendent. Vertical integration is an important measure in a multi-level party, but it 
does not determine the direction of control in the party organization, in the sense 
that no level needs to be subordinated to another.
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Successive conceptions are: the influence that the regional structures exert on 
the central party and the degree of autonomy of the regional structures within the 
integrated party (Thorlakson, 2009). Various authors have produced their own 
variables to measure influence and autonomy. The outline of Fabre seems to be 
especially clear in this regard, she believes that these conceptions reflect in the 
best way the distribution of power within a party and defines them very precisely. 
Influence is “the degree to which regional sub-units (regional party branches) are 
represented in central organs and involved in central decision-making processes” 
(2011). Among the variables, which can be used to describe influence are: the 
selection of the state-wide party leader, the composition of the central party execu-
tive, the selection of candidates for national parliamentary elections, the formu-
lation of party programmes for national parliamentary elections, the process to 
amend the party constitution and the statutory guarantee of the power of regional 
party branches (Fabre, 2011).
The second group of variables describes autonomy that means the extent to 
which regional branches are able to act independently from the central party. 
These are: the ability of regional branches to have an internal organization that is 
not dictated by the central party structure; the selection of regional party leaders; 
the selection of candidates for regional elections; the adoption of regional elec-
tion programmes; the financial autonomy of the regional branches (Fabre, 2011). 
Analysing the party structure Fabre assigned appropriate values  for each of these 
variables. Low ratios indicate that the regional branches are subordinated to the 
central structure (low autonomy) and the regional structures are not involved in 
the decision making process at the central level (low influence). High values, on 
the contrary, are proofs that the party is a confederation of regional branches that 
have a high level of autonomy and control over the central party structure.
Vertical integration allows one to determine links between the different levels 
of the structure, for example: a common party membership, shared finances and 
a common governance structure (Thorlakson, 2009), therefore this can be used to 
test the structures of Europarties in terms of their relationship with the national 
parties which are their members. Some problems may occur when trying to use 
concepts of autonomy and influence. Moon and Bratberg do not mark in their 
conceptualization of the multi-level party (MLP) any difference in relationship 
between the regional and national structures on the one hand, and the European 
and national – on the other, therefore it can be assumed that they consider these 
indicators (autonomy, influence) as relevant to examine the relationship between 
all levels of the MLP structure (2010). However, there is the question as to the 
direction of control in the party organisation. In other words: should we exam-
18 His tor i a  i  Pol it yk a  •  No.  20(27)/2017
Paper s
ine the autonomy and influence of the European or the national structures? In 
the first case, European party structures are treated as additional (supranational) 
arenas of national party activities along with subnational (regional) one. In the 
second, they are regarded as independent political actors – organisations in their 
own right comprised of national political parties which are their members.
Figure 1. Conceptualising Europarties as Multi-level Organizations
Source: developed by the Author.
If we consider that the national level is still the most important one in the mu-
tual relations with the European Union, this is the “master” or “core level” (De-
schouwer, 2000), therefore the direction of control should be – bottom-up. But, 
on the other hand, the concepts used in the study of party structures in federal or 
devolved states seek to determine the autonomy of lower-level structures and the 
influence of lower-level structures at a higher-level, even if the first is a core one 
(e.g. in some parties in Switzerland), therefore perhaps it is worth following on this 
idea. However, the use of the variables suggested by Thorlakson (2013) or Fabre 
(2011) and the rigid setting of them to numerical values  can, at first glance, lead 
to the conclusion that national structures are totally autonomous and exercise full 
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control over the European structures; in other words, the autonomy and influence 
of national structures in each case can obtain maximum values, and this does not 
allow one to capture the differences between Europarties. Nevertheless, a closer 
look at the individual Europarties reveals that while some of them are based on 
national parties, others are more advanced in the elaboration of a model based 
on power delegation to the European structures by the national parties. Moreo-
ver, researches on the bottom-up Europeanization prove that the national parties 
exert influence on Eurparties which they belong to, and studies on the top-down 
Europeanization point out that membership in Europarties lead to a reduction of 
autonomy of national parties, which are Europarties’ members (Ladrech, 2002). 
Hence, the discussed concepts can be used to investigate relations between the na-
tional and European party structures, but they need different operationalization.
Vertical Integration and Influence in Europarties
The concepts of vertical integration and influence are used to prove the hypoth-
esis pointing to differences in the level of vertical integration of the individual 
Europarties as well as the influence which the national parties exert on European 
structures. Autonomy of national parties, which can also be regarded as one of 
the indicators of multi-level party structures requires researches in each of the 
28 member states, which exceeds the scope of this article. But there are a lot of 
studies on top-down Europeanization of political parties that concentrate on this 
issue (Külahci, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2007; Lewis, Mansfeldová, 2006; Ladrech, 
2002).
As vertically integrated are to be considered those Europarties which have their 
structures and compete at both levels of the EU multi-layered system (European, 
national). The level of vertical integration of Europarties is shaped through the 
formal inclusion of national parties from if possible a large number of member 
states (a high level of transnationality), the possession of a common party mem-
bership, as well as the inclusion of national parties’ representation within executive 
body of European party. In turn, as indicators of influence the involvement of 
national parties in Europarty organs as well as the way decisions within the latter 
are taken are considered, and in particular the role that befalls national parties in 
this process.
The research on vertical integration and influence was conducted mainly on 
statutory documents of Europarties. Data from Europarties’ websites were also 
taken into consideration. It results from the exploration that the Europarties con-
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sist of the national parties, which are their members. Hence, the national level 
party structures are formally incorporated into the Europarties. Some of them 
reserve full membership only for political parties from the EU member states, 
other accept as members also organizations and movements from both the EU and 
non EU countries. Vertical integration is connected with the level of inclusiveness 
(Bardi, 2005) or transnationality (Hix, Lord, 1997), which describes the coverage 
degree of the EU by the various Europarties. Each of the two largest Europarties: 
the EPP and the PES has full members in 27 of the 28 EU states. The next two 
parties are the EGP and the ALDE, the first has its members in 25, and the sec-
ond in 22 EU states, however, both accept among the full members also parties 
beyond the EU. Next – the PEL and the EFA have their members respectively in 
16 and 15 EU states; the PEL has also many beyond the Union. Other political 
parties at European level are present in less than half of the member states (the 
AECR, the MELD, the EUD in 11 countries each, the EDP in nine, the AEMN 
and the ECPM in eight each, and the EAF in seven). Moreover, in the AECR, 
the MELD, the EDP, the EAF and the AEMN some states are represented by 
individual MEPs. Europarties, which have their members in a large number of 
member states can be regarded as organizations with a significant degree of verti-
cal integration, others as truncated (active only at one of two considered levels) or 
split (cooperate with parties from another level, but without formal connections) 
(Wolinetz, Carty, 2006). The last situation took place for example when British 
Conservatives cooperated with the EPP in a common group in the EP (till 2009), 
but formally the Conservative Party was not a member of the EPP.
The next indicator of the vertical integration is possessing or not a common 
membership. Although the existing Europarties are mainly the alliance of the 
national political parties, each of them offers a kind of individual membership. 
Some are open for all physical persons (ELDR, PEL, EUD, EAF); others restrict 
their individual membership to MEPs or MPs from the EU member states (EPP, 
EGP, AECR, EDP, EFA, ECPM). The latter offer for physical persons a status of 
supporting members, activists or friends, who can cooperate with Europarties and 
support them, but without the formal rights and obligations of individual mem-
bers. In some parties, there is also a multi-level membership, which means that 
all members of national parties that belong to the Europarty are automatically 
members of that Europarty. This kind of membership exists in PES, EDP and is 
also possible in PEL. The idea is that the Europarties are based on the national 
parties, which have their members, who can also be considered as members of the 
Europarties. The multi-level and therefore common membership is characteristic 
for vertically integrated parties.
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The other indicator of vertical integration is the formal inclusion of national 
parties’ representations within Europarty executive body. The analysis shows that 
there is provided the possibility for representation of all member parties in Eu-
roparty executive body in the statutes of left-wing (PES and PEL), extreme right-
wing (AEMN) and Eurosceptic (EUD) parties. But it is occurred only in the 
leftist organizations. Members of AEMN and EUD do not use in practice their 
capabilities. Other Europarties restrict the executive bodies to narrower groups of 
party officials selected by one of the representative bodies regarded as the highest 
authority in Europarty (generally the Congress, but in the EGP and AECR – the 
Council) on the base of the principles outlined in the statute. To sum up, it seems 
that the representatives of PES and PEL member parties are in the highest degree 
incorporated into Europarties’ executive bodies.
The next concept, which can be used to measure the multi-level organization, 
is the influence, which the national parties exert on the structures of Europarties. 
It is described by two variables: the level of representation of national parties in 
Europarty’ bodies and the way in which political decisions are taken within Eu-
roparty structures (unanimously; qualified, absolute or simple majority). Influence 
is considered strong if the representatives of member parties (party on the ground) 
have a dominating share in the main Europarty bodies, while decisions are taken 
unanimously. As weak influence is considered a state of affairs whereby the rep-
resentatives of other subsystems dominate in Europarty organs – party in central 
office (party officers entering into the composition of collective party bodies) and 
party in public office (politicians entering as a result of holding office within EU 
organs or other organisations), while decisions are undertaken on the basis of an 
ordinary majority.
Table 1 presents the variables, which characterise the involvement of national 
parties in Europarty bodies and the meaning of each score. Each Europarty re-
ceives a code 1-4 for each score. When we take into consideration involvement of 
national parties in the Europarty decision-making bodies (usually Congress and 
Council) – a score of 4 (very strong representation) means that the decision-mak-
ing bodies of the Europarty are composed of almost exclusively representatives 
of members parties. A score of 3 (strong representation) characterises a situation 
in which these bodies are composed of the representatives of member parties, 
but also some representatives of other subsystems of party structure are included. 
A score of 2 (average representations) means that decision-making bodies consist 
of some representatives of member parties and some representatives of other sub-
systems of party structure. A score of 1 (weak representation) means that the rep-
resentatives of member parties are in minority and the other subsystems of party 
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structure dominate. The analyses were made separately for each of the decision-
making bodies (Congress, Council). Moving on to the issue of the involvement 
of national parties in the Europarty executive body (usually Presidency, Bureau, 
Board or Committee) – a score 4 means that it is composed by the representatives 
of all member parties approved by the highest decision-making body. A score of 
3 represents a situation in which the executive body also consists of the representa-
tives elected by the highest decision-making body, but not all member parties are 
represented. A score of 2 means that the body is composed partly by the repre-
sentatives elected by the highest decision-making body, and partly by ex officio 
members, but the former dominate. A score of 1 describes almost the same situa-
tion, but with dominance of the latter.
Table 1. Involvement of National Parties in the Europarties’ Structure – Coding Scheme
Source: developed by the Author on the base of the subject literature.
Table 2 presents the results of the analyses of the level of national parties 
involvement in Europarties’ bodies conducted on the statutory documents of 
Europarties. It is obvious that we are dealing with differences in this respect. 
Involvement of national 
parties in the Europarty’ 
decision-making bodies 
(usually Congress and 
Council)
4 very strong 
representation




representatives of member parties 
and some representatives of other 
subsystems of party structure
2 average 
representation
representatives of member parties 
and a lot of representatives of other 
subsystems of party structure
1 weak 
representation
representatives of member parties in 
minority, domination of other subsystems 
of party structure
Involvement of national 
parties in the Europarty’ 
executive body (usually 
Presidency, Bureau, Board  
or Committee)
4 very strong 
representation
representatives of all member parties 




representatives elected by the highest 




partly representatives elected by the highest 
decision-making body, and partly ex officio 
members, but former dominate
1 weak 
representation
partly representatives elected by the highest 
decision-making body, and partly ex officio 
members, but latter dominate
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Whereas an analysis of the structures of the Party of European Left (score 4), the 
Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy, the European Free Alliance, 
the EU Democrats (score of 3.5 each) and the Party of European Socialists (score 
3.3) leads to a conclusion that the national level is a core one, then an analysis of 
the European People’s Party (score 2) in contrary, shows that the European level is 
also very important. The other parties are located between these extremes. None 
of them has got score 1.

























1 European People’s 
Party (EPP)
2 2 2 2
2 Party of European 
Socialists(PES)
3 3 4 3.3
3 Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats 
for Europe Party 
(ALDE)
3 3 3 3
4 European Green 
Party (EGP)
3 3 3 3




3 3 3 3
6 Party of European 
Left (PEL)
4 4 4 4
7 Movement for a 
Europe of Liberties 
and Democracy 
(MELD)




2 3 2 2.3
9 European Free 
Alliance(EFA)
4 — 3 3.5
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Source: developed by the Author on the base of Europarites’ statutes.
The next indicator of the influence is the way in which political decisions 
within Europarties are taken. In order to analyse the decision-making process the 
following codes were used. Unanimity means a very strong influence of national 
parties (code 4), qualified majority – a strong influence (code 3), absolute majority 
– average (code 2), and simple majority – weak (code 1). The strongest influence on 
the Europarties’ political decisions is exerted by national parties in the PEL (code 
4) and the PES. The latter seeks for achieving consensus, and when this is not pos-
sible, decisions have to be taken by qualified majority (at least 75%). There is also 
the possibility that the decisions do not bind the PES members who do not agree 
with them if they communicate their distinct position before voting. A qualified 
majority is also used in the EGP (code 3). In turn, the EPP and the ECPM use 
absolute majority (code 2), the ALDE, the AECR, the EDP, the EFA, the EAF 
and the EUD – the simple majority (code 1). In the statutes of the MELD and the 
AEMN there is a lack of information on the subject.
To sum up, it results from the research that the most vertically integrated Eu-
roparties (a high level of transnationality, common multi-level membership, inclu-

























10 European Alliance 
for Freedom (EAF)
2 — 3 2.5





2 3 4 3
12 European Christian 
Political Movement 
(ECPM)
2 — 3 2.5
13 EU Democrats 
(EUD)
3 — 4 3.5
Tab. 2 – continue
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in which the national parties maintain the strongest influence (strong representa-
tion of national parties in the main bodies, the taking of decisions in accordance 
with the principle of unanimity) should be considered the Party of the European 
Left and the Party of European Socialists. Both groupings are created on the basis 
of national structures, which have preserved within them the dominant position. 
Particularly in view of the fact that the mentioned Europarties are left-wing in 
nature one may conjecture a hypothesis with regard to further research into Eu-
roparties, namely that the level of vertical integration and influence is conditioned 
by the ideological-programme face of the Europarty. Of importance is the fact 
that the two largest parties which have achieved the greatest level of transnational-
ity – the Party of European Socialists and the European People’s Party build their 
structures in a different way. While the former bases itself on national parties, the 
latter to a greater degree separates itself from them incorporating into its organs 
numerous representatives of the party in public office subsystem (e.g. members of 
the EP and the EC). The EPP has been considered the only Europarty in which 
the national parties have an average influence, in all the others it is deemed as 
strong or very strong. This not only confirms the hypothesis as to the differentia-
tion of Europarties in relation to the degree of vertical integration and the influ-
ence of national parties on European structures, but it also means that there are 
no model solutions in the area of relations amongst Europarties and the national 
parties which are their members.
Conclusions
The hypothesis that Europarties are political parties sensu stricto was verified on the 
basis of two main approaches in the defining of parties – the functional and the 
structural. Although European political parties do not perform or do not perform 
well the functions parties are traditionally expected to fulfil, they have their struc-
tures in all three fields of party activity (party on the ground, party in public office, 
party in central office). Even if Europarties are not the only actors in any of them, 
exclusively they undertake activities in each of them. Moreover, when we take into 
account changes taking place in the contemporary parties – weakening parties’ ties 
with civil society, their closer ties with the state, strengthening of the party execu-
tives, increasing role of party elites, decrease in the number of members etc., we 
must admit that Europarties do not differ too much from this picture.
In the article the multi-level approach was used to research on Europarties. 
At the present stage of scientific reflection on Europarties, it seems that they can 
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be researched both as additional arenas for the activities of domestic parties and 
as independent political actors comprised of national political parties which are 
their members. Here the second perspective was chosen. This allowed confirming 
the hypothesis that the individual Europarties differ in terms of the relationship 
between European and national level of party structures. In particular we man-
aged to show that the two major parties the EPP and the PES use in this regard 
quite different solutions, while some similarity can be seen in two leftist parties 
the PES and the PEL.
The analysis of Europarties conducted as on multi-level organisations, un-
doubtedly opens up a new research perspective. Scholars employing the classic 
model of the institutionalisation of Europarties as coined by Niedermayer (1983) 
place Europarties between the second and third phase of development. In their 
opinion, European organisations not only make contacts easier for national par-
ties (the first phase) but concentrate on transnational coordination (the second 
phase) though are not yet fully integrated parties (the third phase) (Johannsson, 
Zervakis, 2002). In this conception increasing the level of Europarty integration 
would mean limiting the influence and autonomy of national parties (Sandström, 
2004). Contrary to these views, the development of Europarties within the multi-
level EU political system does not have to represent their separation from national 
parties, quite the reverse. One may state that basing themselves on national par-
ties lies in the interests of Europarties. One may even go as far as stating that the 
stronger the former are, the greater the significance of Europarties becomes.
The multileveled nature of the EU system and the dispersion of the decision 
making process mean that only Europarties possessing strong structures at all 
levels are able to influence this process at all its stages. Hence, when we look for 
a master level of Europarties structures, we should indicate not only differences 
between the individual parties, but also between areas of their activity. Where 
given tasks are realised at the level of EU member states (intergovernmental) 
a significant role is played by national party structure; however, when decisions are 
taken at a supranational level, this creates greater possibilities for action for Euro-
pean party structures. Only a party with structures at each stage where decisions 
are taken can fully influence this process. Therefore, the problem appears to be not 
so much the opposition of national parties against the transfer of certain tasks to 
the European structures of which they are members, for this is often unnecessary, 
but the insufficient activity of national parties in the field of accomplishing tasks 
imposed on them through the processes of integration (e.g. the shortfalls in the 
mobilisation of citizens to take part in elections to the EP).
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